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An assessment of Turkey’s cultural power in the Arab world in light of its




1 “My country is your faithful ally and friend” (Erdoğan Mar. 30, 2003). This statement
made by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and addressed to Arab people in March
2003 marks a turning point in the history of Turkish-Arab relations. In fact, since the
establishment  of  the  Turkish  Republic  by  Mustafa  Kemal  Atatürk  in  October  1923,
Turkey’s foreign policy and strategic thinking were best illustrated by the motto “The
Turk has no friend but the Turk.” Ankara saw the Middle East region, in particular,
more as a sphere of risk than a sphere of opportunity. The Turks’ wariness and mistrust
of the Arabs,  who were seen as the “enemies of the interior”1 and were accused of
accelerating  the  fall  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  coupled  with  the  multiplication  of
territorial  disputes  with  Arab  states2,  provoked  a  detachment  and  a  separation  of
Turkey from the Middle East. In this sense, the securitization of the Middle East region
for much of the 20th century meant that the interaction between Turkey and the Arabs
was either non-existent or, when existent, entirely based on hard power or the threat
of the use of military force3. The conflicting character of the relations between Arab
countries and Turkey was reinforced, in the beginning of the 20th century, by the rise of
Arab nationalism, which conceived the Ottoman Empire as an oppressive entity, and its
heir – the Turkish republic – as alienated from the West4. 
2 However, since the arrival of the Justice and Development Party [Adalet  ve Kalkınma
Partisi,  AKP]  to  power  in  2002,  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  and  strategic  thinking  have
undergone a major paradigm shift (Sözen 2010). Given its Islamist roots, the AKP was
able to bring Turkey closer to its Muslim identity and Ottoman past and to restore and
re-establish links with the Arab and Muslim neighbourhood. Therefore, as of 2002, and
until the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, Turkey’s public discourse and conduct of
foreign policy have reflected a de-securitization of the Middle East/Arab region and a
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push away from hard power.  In  fact,  in  the 2000s,  and for  the first  time since the
establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has had a strong presence in the Middle
East,  not  through  its  hard  power  and  military  capabilities,  nor  through  its
confrontational attitude and coercive capacity, but rather through its cultural exports
to the region.  Certainly,  the Syrian crisis  and the recent renewal of  armed conflict
between the PKK and the Turkish army have marked a reversal of this trend and a
return to the use of hard power. Nevertheless, this evolution does not invalidate the
cultural offensive of Turkey in the Arab world. 
3 Based on Turkey’s newly acquired cultural attractiveness in the Middle East, several
scholars  and  journalists  published  works  discussing  the  so-called  “soft  power”  in
Turkish foreign policy  vis-à-vis  the  Arab world.  Titles  such as  Soft  Power  in  Turkish
Foreign Policy: New Instruments and Challenges (Öner 2013), Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
in Turkey (Kalın 2011), Challenges to Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East (Altunışık 2011),
or  Turkey’s  soft  power  on  the  rise  despite  challenges  (Akarçeşme  Apr.  2,  2013)  have
proliferated.  However,  these  works  have  all  taken  the  concept  of  “soft  power”  for
granted and have failed to question its relevance. In fact, the concept of “soft power,”
as defined by Joseph Nye, is very broad and can cover various realities and distinct
phenomena. If  “soft power” is the “ability to get what you want through attraction
rather than through coercion or payments” (Nye, 2005: 5), its mechanisms and vectors
remain unclear and ill-defined. In particular, Joseph Nye does not properly address the
following questions: Who produces “soft power”? For which purpose? Through which
particular  instruments  and  strategies?  Is  “soft  power”  effective  everywhere  and
anytime or does its efficiency depend on the local context in which it is projected? 
4 In this article, I will not disqualify the concept of soft power, but I will rather attempt
to determine and identify its “origins” and vectors through the particular case study of
Turkey’s  “soft  power” in the Middle East  region.  I  consider “soft  power” to be the
ability of an actor to seduce and attract others and thereby “win hearts and minds”. I
argue that Turkey’s “soft power” in the Arab world lies mainly in Turkey’s media and
audio-visual  presence  in  the  Middle  East.  Such  “soft  power”  is  projected  by  two
different  types  of  actors:  the  Turkish  government  on  the  one  hand,  and  non-
governmental actors on the other hand – namely media production companies acting
as private “cultural entrepreneurs”. The article is based on more than 50 interviews
conducted  with  state  and  non-state  actors  (businessmen,  civil  society,  production
companies)  in  Turkey and the Middle  East  (Egypt,  Kurdistan Regional  Government,
Lebanon, Qatar, and UAE) between 2011 and 2014. 
5 In the first part of our analysis, I examine the conceptual framework and theoretical
foundations of Turkey’s paradigm shift with regard to the Middle East. In particular, I
explore the so-called “Davutoğlu doctrine” of “strategic depth” [stratejik derinlik] and
its  impact  in  terms  of  paving  the  way  for  Turkey’s  re-engagement  with  its  Arab
neighbours. 
6 In the second part, I discuss the vectors of Turkish “soft power” in the Middle East and
the actors involved in the projection of such power. I examine the export, by Turkish
media producers, of soap operas [diziler] to the region; by analysing their content and
representations,  we  attempt  to  interpret  the  message  that  these  popular  culture
products convey to the Arab public. I then turn to the projection of “soft power” by the
Turkish government and focus on the launching of the Arabic-language TV channel –
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TRT Al Arabiyya.  I  also analyse the connections and interaction between the Turkish
government and private actors in terms of projecting “cultural power” in the region. 
7 In the third part, I  assess the impact of Turkey’s “soft power” in the Middle East.  I
discuss  the limitations  of  Turkey’s  cultural  power both in  terms of  theoretical  and
analytical  relevance  and  practical  and  contextual  efficacy.  I  argue  that  while  the
cultural  actions  of  the  Turkish  government  and  private  entrepreneurs  might  have
rendered  Turkey  “popular”  for  the  Arab  masses,  they  have  nevertheless  produced
limited outcomes in terms of increasing Turkey’s general power capacity in the region.
Moreover, I examine the impact of the so-called “Arab Spring” on Turkey’s use of soft
power  in  the  region:  I  show  that  with  the  outbreak  of  the  Arab  uprisings,  and
particularly with the beginning of the Syrian revolution, Turkey has been compelled to
move away from soft power and to embrace hard power in the conduct of its foreign
policy vis-à-vis the Middle East. 
 
I. “Strategic Depth” and the “Davutoğlu Doctrine”: a
reengagement with the Arab world
8 Turkey’s rapprochement with the Middle East must mainly be understood in light of
the  so-called  “Davutoğlu  Doctrine”  (Grigoriadis  2010).  Currently  serving  as  Prime
Minister (2014-), and formerly nominated Erdoğan’s foreign affairs advisor (2003-2009)
and later Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs (2009-2014), Ahmet Davutoğlu has had an
important influence on the design of Turkey’s foreign policy, as confirmed by several
Turkish policymakers whom I interviewed in Ankara. When the AKP seized power in
November 2002, it was a newly-born party (created in 2001) with little or no experience
in  terms of  foreign affairs.  The party  therefore  looked for  experts  of  international
relations to help design the country’s foreign policy. Given that Ahmet Davutoğlu was
known to be an intellectual with a conservative background whose affinities coincide
with those of the AKP5, he was nominated Prime Minister Erdoğan’s advisor and was
invited to put into practice a vision that he had formulated in 2001. 
9 In 2001, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was at that time professor of International Relations at
Boğazıçı  University,  published  a  book  titled  Stratejik  Derinlik:  Türkiye’nin  Uluslararası
Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position),  in which he articulated a
new  strategic  vision  for  Turkey  (Davutoğlu  2001).  In  this  seminal  work,  Davutoğlu
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Turkey in the 21st century and suggests ways
by which Turkey could become a global power. 
10 Davutoğlu’s main argument is straightforward: In the post-Cold war order, a country’s
significance and power on the world stage lies on its “strategic depth” (Jabbour 2011).
For a country to be a “central state” [merkez ülke] and a leading actor in international
relations, it must possess “geographical depth” – meaning an exceptional geopolitical
location – and “historical depth”, meaning a rich cultural and historical background
(Davutoğlu 2001: 87). Considering the Turkish case, Davutoğlu asserts that his country
is uniquely endowed to be a central state. In fact, with regard to geographical depth,
Turkey is strategically positioned at the confluence of East and West, at the intersection
of the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Europe. Its exceptional
location on the Rimland belt grants it the natural ability to influence the regional and
international geopolitical balances. With regard to historical depth, Turkey has a rich
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historical and cultural legacy as heir to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, based on the
cultural and historical ties it has with the former Ottoman territories, Turkey must be
able  to  increase  its  influence  and  power  in  neighbouring  regions.  In  the  words  of
Davutoğlu: 
Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the
responsibility  to  follow  an  integrated  and  multidimensional  foreign  policy.  The
unique  combination  of  our  history  and  geography  brings  with  it  a  sense  of
responsibility. To contribute actively towards conflict resolution and international
peace and security in all these areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a
multidimensional history of Turkey (Ibid.: 142).
11 Yet,  while  all  neighbouring regions are seen as  important,  Davutoğlu  considers  the
Middle East to be of utmost significance and value for Turkey. Reviving the geopolitical
theories  developed by Halford Mackinder and Nicholas  Spykman,  Davutoğlu  asserts
that the Middle East region is located in the heart of Eurasia, and is therefore “key to
strategic  balances”  (Ibid.:  357).  Whoever  is  able  to  control  this  area  will  be  able  to
greatly  influence  regional  and  international  power  configurations  (Ibid.:  146).
Therefore,  according  to  the  professor-turned-politician,  Turkey  should  increase  its
influence  in  the  Middle  East  so  as  to  create  a  regional  “hinterland,”  necessary  for
Ankara’s rise in the international arena (Ibid.: 155).
12 After stating the importance of the Middle East, Davutoğlu suggests means to increase
Turkey’s  power  in  this  region.  The  author  insists  that  Turks  must  first  “overcome
psychological  barriers” and reconcile with their Muslim identity and their Ottoman
past, so that they can genuinely use Turkey’s historical and identity ties with the Arabs
in order to facilitate interaction with the Middle East and therefore increase Ankara’s
regional leverage. While the language he uses is pragmatic and not ideological, his book
nevertheless includes a “neo-Ottoman” tone: Neo-Ottomanism is not understood here
in  its  “hard  version”  –  as  a  willingness  to  restore  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  its
geographical and territorial extension (which would mean eliminating borders) – but is
rather  understood  in  its  “soft  version,”  as  an  inclination  to  restore  the  cultural
influence and prestige of Turkey in the territories that were once part of the Ottoman
Empire (Taspinar 2008). In fact, in order to help Turkey rise to the status of regional
power, Davutoğlu emphasizes the necessity of making his country culturally attractive
and of developing horizontal relations between the Turkish society and Arab societies
(Davutoğlu 2001: 615). Hence, the idea of “soft power” – as conceptualized by Joseph
Nye – is clearly incorporated in Davutoğlu’s thinking. However, the term “soft power”
is not used by Davutoğlu, nor does he specify what instruments and tools should be
used to make Turkey culturally attractive in the region. His thought therefore remains
theoretical and does not provide a concrete blueprint for action. 
13 When Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2003, he
became one of the few intellectuals – after Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger and
Alvaro  Garcia  Linera6 –  to  be  nominated  to  a  state  position  and  to  be  offered  the
opportunity  to  put  his  theory  into  practice. Hence,  since  2003  the  conceptual
framework he developed has structured and guided Turkey’s diplomatic action in the
regional and international arenas. In particular, a new policy of rapprochement with
the  Middle  East  has  been  set  in  motion,  with  a  constant  use  of  “soft  power”
instruments. 
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14 In fact, throughout the 2000s, Turkey has been culturally present in the Middle East,
particularly through popular culture and audio-visual products. It is to the examination
of these instruments that we now turn. 
 
II. A complex and multidimensional “seduction
enterprise”: the projection of Turkey’s cultural power in
the region by the AKP government and private actors
15 Turkey’s cultural influence in the Arab world is a direct consequence of the actions and
initiatives  of  two  types  of  actors:  on  the  one  hand,  the  export  by  private  Turkish
companies of TV series (soap operas) to the Middle East, and on the other hand, the
launching by the Turkish government of a TV channel dedicated to the Arab audience:
TRT Al Arabiyya. 
 
Popular culture and soap operas as means to win the hearts and
minds of the Arab masses: the projection of cultural power by
private Turkish entrepreneurs. 
16 Turkey’s  “soft  power”  in  the  region  is  mostly  based  on  popular  culture  and  mass
entertainment. Indeed, Turkey’s cultural prestige and attractiveness in the Middle East
are closely associated with the export of soap operas that have swept the region and
turned into a social phenomenon worthy of academic and scholarly attention. 
17 While  soap  operas  are  popular  in  every  part  of  the  world,  they  are  particularly
significant in the context of the Arab world, where they constitute an inherent and
essential  part  of  social  life  (Gonzales-Quijano  2011:  116).  In  fact,  soap  operas,  or
musalsalat  in  Arabic,  are  widely  consumed  in  the  Middle  East:  They  are  watched
collectively with family and friends or individually; they are broadcasted on a “small
screen” in private houses or on a big screen in public spaces like coffee shops; and they
are seen during daytime or night-time, and even after iftar (the meal that breaks the
fast) in the holy month of Ramadan. Traditionally,  as of the 1960s,  the Arab drama
scene has been dominated by Egyptian musalsalat, generally displaying love-and-hate
stories and socially-inspired comedies (with the famous Egyptian actor Adel Imam for
example) or offering a biographical account of historical figures (for instance the life of
President  Gamal  Abdelnasser,  of  King  Faruk,  and  of  the  artists  Asmahan  and  Oum
Kalthoum).  These  soap  operas,  which  were  all  in  Egyptian  dialect,  gained  wide
popularity across the Middle East and contributed to Egypt’s regional hegemony. In the
1990s,  however,  Syria  developed  its  own  capacity  to  produce  soap  operas  and
succeeded  in  competing  with,  and  even dethroning,  Egyptian  musalsalat.  Here  also,
Syrian soap operas – exported to the Arab world in Syrian dialect – have allowed the
country to gain visibility  in the Middle East,  and to increase its  regional  clout  and
prestige.  Hence,  given  the  pervasiveness  of  TV  series  in  the  Arab  world  and  the
potential that they offer in terms of “soft power,” whoever is able to dominate the soap
opera industry and to export its own musalsalat to the region can, at least to a certain
extent, spread its worldview, values, and ideas to Arab populations, and build cultural
prestige in the region. 
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18 In the 2000s Turkey followed the trend set by Egypt and Syria and started to export
soap operas to the Middle East. From the outset, it is important to state two facts. First,
there  was  a  demand in  the  Arab  world  for  new media  products  and for  musalsalat
different from those produced by Egypt and Syria. Therefore, Turkish soap operas were
welcomed. Second, the production and export of the Turkish series to the region is the
work of private companies that are not linked to official circles in Ankara. These actors,
whom we can call “cultural entrepreneurs,” produced the TV series essentially for a
local  Turkish  public  with  the  sole  objective  of  doing  business  and  making  profit;
however, as the first series were exported to the Arab world and became popular in this
region, they have contributed to Turkey’s “soft power,” something that the cultural
entrepreneurs  were  neither  planning  nor  expecting.  And  while  the  Turkish
government did not provide any public support for these cultural  entrepreneurs,  it
nevertheless capitalized on the success of these series to increase Ankara’s prestige in
the Arab street. 
 
Fig. 1
Promotional material showing protagonists Mehmet/Muhannad and Gümüş/Nour from Gümüş soap
opera
19 Three  different  categories  of  Turkish  soap  operas  are  exported  to  the  Middle  East
(Gonzales Quijano 2011): romances, historical dramas, and political thrillers. Each of
these categories promote a certain image or “brand” of Turkey. The first “conquest” of
the Middle East by Turkish soap operas started in 2008 with the export of the romantic
soap  opera  Gümüş (Silver)  which, with  its  85  million  Arab  viewers,  represented  a
genuine success story in the Middle East (Fig. 1). While the series was also popular in
other regions such as the Balkans and Central Europe, it recorded its biggest audience
ratings  in  the  Arab  world  (Rotivel  2011).  Gümüş  follows  the  story  of  the  wealthy,
handsome  gentleman  Mehmet  (played  by  Kıvanç  Tatlıtuğ)  who  is  forced  by  his
grandfather to marry his cousin Gümüş (played by Songül Öden), a young lady with a
conservative background born and raised in a traditional village of Anatolia. Beyond
the love story that eventually unfolds between Gümüş and Mehmet, mesmerizing the
Arab public,  the series  became attractive in the region as it  portrayed Turkey as  a
country where people have a modern yet Muslim-compatible lifestyle: The protagonists
drink alcohol, dance in nightclubs, and kiss in public, yet they often pray, and they
respect the patriarchal model of their family by listening to the elders7 and living with
their parents. Moreover, throughout the series, the viewers witness the emancipation
of  the  female  character  Gümüş.  With  the  strong  support  of  her  husband  Mehmet,
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Gümüş  becomes a  successful  businesswoman and a  renowned fashion designer;  she
therefore personifies the ideal of a Muslim lady who perfectly succeeds in both business
duties and household responsibilities. 
 
Fig. 2
A Lebanese shopkeeper selling T-shirts with the photos of Nour and Muhannad
20 In  Egypt,  Syria,  Lebanon,  Morocco,  Qatar,  and  Saudi  Arabia,  the  series  created  a
phenomenon of Gümüş-mania (Figs. 2, 4). Ladies rushed to buy T-shirts and posters with
the  photo  of  their  favourite  character;  newborn  babies  were  named  after  the
protagonists;  some divorces were recorded due to the fact that Arab wives were no
longer content with their husbands and demanded that the latters be as romantic as
“Mehmet”  (Buccianti  2010).  While  the  series  was  first  aired  on  the  Saudi  satellite
channel MBC in the daytime slot (2 pm), its high audience ratings pushed the managers
of MBC to broadcast it in evening prime time (9.30 pm) (Buccianti 2010). 
21 Being a success story in the Arab world, the series Gümüş paved the way for the export
of other popular Turkish romantic soap operas like Aşk ve Ceza (Love and Punishment),
Öyle  Bir  Geçer  Zaman  Ki  (Time  goes  by), Aşk-ı  Memnu  (Forbidden  Love), Asi , and 
Fatmagül’ün  Suçu  Ne?  (What  is  Fatmagül’s  fault?),  all  of  which  have  reached  high
audience ratings in the region8. Our interviews in Turkey show that Turkish producers
originally created their series exclusively for a local Turkish audience9. However, the
popularity that Gümüş acquired in the Arab world made them realize the potential and
opportunities offered by the Middle East market. Motivated by economic and financial
gains, they have, since then, attempted to export their series to the Arab world. 
22 The plots of the romantic soap operas exported to the Arab market are often identical:
Almost all the stories revolve around a conservative family who moves from Anatolia to
engage in business in Istanbul, and who succeeds in business without compromising
religious values and Muslim traditions. The importance and significance of these soap
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operas in terms of cultural power and social attractiveness lies in the fact that they
promote an image of Turkey as an ideal society where Islam coexists with modernity,
where men and women are equal, and where capitalism and consumerism do not erode
social and religious values. This is precisely the ideal-type of society that Muslims and
Arabs are longing for, but which they cannot find in their own countries. In this sense,
Turkish romantic soap operas are – for the Arab populations – a means to escape their
grim reality; they offer them the possibility to imagine themselves living in a better
world. In other words, Turkish diziler act like a mirror that reflects what a majority of
Arab viewers dreams of10: embracing modernity without compromising their religious
values and social traditions. Therefore, by conveying images and representations that
appeal to the Arab public, Turkish romantic soaps have contributed to “winning hearts
and minds” and making Turkey attractive in the imaginary of Arab viewers. 
 
Fig. 3
Promotional material for Muhteşem Yüzyıl presenting the main cast of the series
23 The  second  category  of  Turkish  soap  operas  are  the  historical  series,  mostly
exemplified by Muhteşem Yüzyıl (Magnificent Century), a hit series in the Middle East
(Fig. 3). Produced by the company Tims Production, the series is based on the life of
Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, the longest reigning Sultan of the Ottoman Empire,
and his wife Hürrem. The soap opera glorifies the Ottoman past and revives Turkish
history in the minds of Turks and Arabs. What is of major importance in our analysis is
the political message indirectly conveyed to the Arab and Muslim audience through
this soap opera: An in-depth analysis of the script shows that Muhteşem Yüzyıl portrays
the Ottoman Empire – and by inference Turkey – as a legitimate power and a perfect
representative  of  Arabs  and  Muslims  worldwide.  Throughout  the  series,  we  note  a
recurrence  of  the  terms  “Islam,”  “Muslim,”  and  “Jihad”  hundreds  of  times,  and  a
repetition of several statements that convey the message that the past rulers of this
country (the Sultan-Caliphs)  ruled “with the Koran and the Sharia” and “protected
Islam and Muslims against infidels and heretics”11. For instance, we note statements
like: “I want to combat for the cause of Allah, for it is a sacred duty”; “Our mission is to
spread the light of Islam; May Allah be with us”12. Furthermore, the series implicitly
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reminds  the  Middle  Eastern  populations  of  their  historical  ties  with  Turkey.  For
instance, we find significant statements by Suleiman the Magnificent like: “I am the
Sultan of Anatolia, Diyarbakır, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Damascus, Aleppo, Egypt, Mecca,
Jerusalem, and Yemen. I  am the Sultan of  Arab territories which my ancestors had
conquered”;  “I  rule  over  the  Safavids,  the  Mameluks  of  Egypt,  the  Abbasids,  Syria,
Palestine, Hijaz, and the Silk Road”13. 
 
Fig. 4
An Egyptian magazine reporting about the wedding of the Turkish actress Nur Fettahoğlu playing the
role of Mahidevran Sultan in Muhteşem Yüzyıl
24 Hence, by emphasizing the historical ties between Turks and Arabs under the Ottoman
Empire, and by portraying Turkey as heir to the Caliphate, an institution that defended
Muslims and spread the word of Islam, Muhteşem Yüzyıl attempts to appeal to Muslims
in the Arab world, who have long suffered from a lack of credible leadership14. As to
Arab Christian viewers who follow this series, our interviews and research show that
Muhteşem Yüzyıl attracts them for a variety of reasons:  While some of the Christian
viewers  watch  the  series  because  they  are  curious  about  history  –  especially  the
“Golden era” of Sultan Suleiman – the majority of them follows the musalsal because
they are attracted by the action and the plot in the series (the love intrigues in the
Harem), the costumes and accessories that the characters wear, the theme songs, as
well as the beauty of the actors and actresses, in particular Meryem Uzerli playing the
role  of  Hürrem  (Fig.  5).  Therefore,  everybody  seems  to  like  the  series,  albeit  for
different reasons. What’s more, the series appealed not only to the Arab populations,
but also to the Kurds of Syria and Iraq. In fact, during our visit to Erbil, we noticed a
real interest for Muhteşem Yüzyıl (and all the Turkish soap operas in general): In the
streets of Erbil, several advertisements were promoting the next episode of the series,
An illusionary power of seduction?
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 21 | 2015
9
shops were selling accessories like the ones used by the characters, and taxi drivers
often spoke with enthusiasm about the beauty of “Sultana Hürrem”. 
 
Fig. 5
An Emirati magazine talking about the costumes and the fashion style of the actress Meryem Uzerli
playing the part of Hürrem in Muhteşem Yüzyıl
25 Here again, it  is interesting to note that the production of historical series was not
politically  motivated,  but  only  based  on  economic  and  financial  incentives.  In  an
interview we made with Timur Savcı, producer of Muhteşem Yüzyıl, he asserted that his
“main objective when producing this series was to sell a story and a product which
everybody, in Turkey and in the neighbouring regions, would relate to”15. According to
Savcı, creating a series based on the life of Suleiman the Magnificent and the history of
the Ottoman Empire was a rational choice: Turks would be attracted by the rediscovery
of their past; Muslim and Turkmen populations in the Arab world, Central Asia, and the
Balkans would identify with the story as they share the same identity,  history,  and
values of Turkey, while other people would at least be attracted by the setting, the
sound and light effects, and the expensive costumes and accessories (a budget of 70
million dollars). 
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Fig. 6
Promotional material for Kurtlar Vadisi
26 Finally, the third category of soap operas exported to the Middle East are the political
thriller  series  exemplified by Kurtlar  Vadisi (Valley of  the Wolves).  Produced by the
company PanaFilm, aired in Turkey in 2007 and exported to the Arab world in 2008,
this series promotes an image of Turkey as a powerful country able to confront the
West. The series revolves around the Turkish intelligence agent Polat Alemdar (played
by Necati Şaşmaz) whose mission is to defend Iraqis against American occupation (Fig.
6). The series is built around a Manichean vision of the world in which Americans are
portrayed as evil, “the bad guys”, “the barbarians”, while the Turkish characters are
presented  as  “the  good  guys,”  the  “benevolent  forces”,  and  the  big  brothers  and
godfathers of an oppressed Arab and Muslim population. One statement in the script is
particularly emblematic: In a scene where Polat Alemdar meets an Israeli agent and an
American soldier, he says: “All those who had ruled this region in the past oppressed
local  populations,  except  our  ancestors.  Our  ancestors  taught  us  to  fight  against
injustice,  colonization,  and  imperialism”16.  The  message  conveyed,  whether
intentionally  or  unintentionally,  is  the  following:  Turkey  is  a  nation  who  has  the
political courage to challenge Western domination and to stand up for moral values. 
27 Because of the success of this series in the Arab world, the company PanaFilm produced
a  movie  titled  Kurtlar  Vadisi  Filistin (Valley  of  the  Wolves,  Palestine).  The  story  is
inspired by the Mavi Marmara Flotilla episode.17 It revolves around a group of Turks
who send a humanitarian convoy to Gaza and attempt to provide assistance for the
Palestinian population. The language used in the movie is telling: For example, in one
scene, when an Israeli soldier asks the Turkish character why he came to Israel, the
latter answers: “I did not come to Israel, I came to Palestine” (Fig. 7). In another scene,
an Israeli agent tells the Turkish character: “You know you won’t make it out from our
Promised Land”, to which the latter answers “I don’t know what part of this land has
been promised to you, but I promise you six feet under” (Figs. 8, 9). The date of the
series’ release is not trivial: Coming out in 2010, the movie resonated with Ankara’s
fiery rhetoric against Israel at that time and the degradation of its relations with Tel
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Aviv. It provided support for Erdoğan’s denunciation of Israeli killings during the Davos
meetings of March 2009, and to Turkey’s harsh stance regarding the Israeli assault on
the Mavi Marmara ship. By portraying Turkey as the champion of the Palestinian cause,
the movie seduced the Arab audience and pushed it to perceive Turkey as a good leader
at the regional and international level, and as a legitimate and credible representative
of the Arab world. 
 
Fig. 7
Scene from Kurtlar vadısı where a Turkish intelligence agent is talking with an Israeli soldier
 
Fig. 8
Screen capture showing the main character Polat Alemdar adopting a defiant language
when addressing to an Israeli protagonist
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Fig. 9
Screen capture showing the main character Polat Alemdar adopting a defiant language
when addressing to an Israeli protagonist
28 Beyond the representations and the images that Turkish soap operas convey and that
appeal  to  Arab  populations,  the  success  of  the  diziler is  due  to  other  factors,  in
particular their quality of production on the one hand and the structure and nature of
the Arab export market on the other hand. In terms of production, the Turkish soap
opera industry is highly developed compared to its Arab counterpart. Benefitting from
a good economic situation in their country, production companies are dedicating huge
budgets  to  create  high-standard  series  that  can  compete  with  international  and
American hit series. The quality of the image and sound, the professional performance
and the charisma of the actors, the realistic scenarios, the attractiveness of the music
and  theme  song,  and  the  beauty  of  the  picturesque  shots  (at  the  Bosphorus,  in
luxurious villas), have all contributed to the popular appeal of these series. Moreover,
the format used made the series competitive: The majority of the diziler are made up of
two to four seasons,  each composed of thirty 90-minute episodes.  This makes them
price-competitive, as broadcasters and TV channels buy long episodes that can fill up
lengthy airing time.  Hence,  the success of  Turkish soap operas lies  in part  in their
production strategies. 
29 Additionally, it is the export strategies that account for their popularity in the Arab
world. In fact, Turkish diziler are dubbed not in classical Arabic but in colloquial Arabic,
the language that people use in their daily life. Through the use of dialects with which
people can connect,  these series easily penetrate the minds of  the Arab public  and
allow  the  viewers  to  identify  with  the  characters  and  accept  the  message  that  is
indirectly  conveyed  in  the  scenario.  The  dialect,  in  this  sense,  creates  a  sense  of
proximity between the Arab viewer and the soap opera on the one hand, and between
Turkish and Arab societies  on the other hand.  Dubbing was made in Syrian dialect
rather than Egyptian dialect. In our opinion, this choice might have been driven by two
factors. The first relates to market economics: Given that in the 2000s Syrian musalsat
dethroned their Egyptian counterparts and became more popular, it was logical and
rational that the Turkish series be dubbed in this dialect to ensure their success. The
second reason may be political: When the first Turkish soap opera, Gümüş, was aired on
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Arab TV channels in 2008, Syria and Turkey enjoyed excellent diplomatic, economic
and  social  relations.  Erdoğan  and  Bashar  al-Assad  were  close  friends;  Ankara  and
Damascus signed a free trade agreement and were considering the lift of visas;18 and
diplomatic  visits  were  very  frequent  between  the  two  countries.  The  soap  opera
industry  has  therefore  benefitted from the Turkish-Syrian honeymoon.  It  is  indeed
highly probable that the dubbing in Syrian dialect was made possible by the political
rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara. Our research shows, in fact, that all
Turkish diziler were translated into Arabic  in  Damascus by three Syrian production
companies – Sama Art Production, Firdaws Art Production, and ABC Damascus – and
were  dubbed by  Syrian  actors.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  Syrian  uprising  and  the
ensuing degradation of relations between Bashar al-Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
Syria has suspended its dubbing work of Turkish soap operas and has stopped airing
them, thus proving that there is a political dimension to the dubbing. These series are
now being dubbed in Dubai by Emirati companies19. 
 
Fig. 10
A Lebanese magazine article talking about a night organized in Beirut on the theme of Muhteşem
Yüzyıl
30 In addition to dubbing, we also note that the names of the characters and the title of
the soap operas have been adapted to the Arab context. In Gümüş, for example ,  the
name of the main character “Mehmet” becomes “Muhannad”20 in the Arabic-dubbed
version of the series;  similarly,  “Gümüş” becomes “Nour”, a common female Arabic
name. Very amusingly, the title of the series Muhteşem Yüzyıl,  which literally means
“Magnificent Century,” was translated in Arabic into a very different name: “Harim el-
Sultan,” which means “The Sultan’s Harem” (Fig. 10). In fact, the expression “Sultan’s
Harem” speaks to the imaginary of Arab viewers for whom the harem is a subject of
phantasms and a symbol of an exotic world in which all desires are fulfilled. Therefore,
the title in itself made the series very appealing for the Arab public. 
31 The  success  of  Turkish  soap  operas  in  the  Middle  East  is  not  only  based  on  their
dubbing language and their adaptation to the Arab context, but also on the nature and
structure of the Arab drama industry. While Arab soap operas display love stories but
avoid touching upon “sensitive” topics such as premarital sex, abortion, and women
emancipation, Turkish soap operas deal with these “real” issues that are seen by the
Arab public as relevant, attractive, and linked to reality. In terms of format, Arab soap
operas are usually produced with very low budgets, which impacts negatively on their
quality  (image  and  sound,  actors’  performance,  marketing  strategies,  etc.).  These
shortcomings of the Arab media have therefore left a room for the Turkish diziler to
take hold in Middle East societies. 
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32 Our analysis has thus far shown that the projection of “soft power” through Turkish
soap operas is the result of non-governmental actors. It is important here to consider
the interaction between these actors and the Turkish government, and to study the
role,  if  any,  played  by  the  latter.  Our  field  research  and  interviews  with  Turkish
producers show clearly that production companies did not receive any kind of material
or  moral  support  from  political  actors  and  governmental  circles.  The  producer  of
Muhteşem Yüzyıl, Timur Savcı,  even told us that when his production team asked for
authorization  to  shoot  in  Topkapı  palace,  the  government  only  granted  them
permission for a few days, and the team later had to create its own palace-like setting. 
33 However, we notice that while the government did not contribute to the production of
Turkish  soap  operas,  it  nevertheless  attempted  to  “surf”  on  their  popularity  and
success in order to increase Ankara’s influence and prestige in the region and to build a
regional power. Two anecdotes provide concrete illustrations. In an interview with a
diplomat in Ankara21 we were told that during a visit to the United Arab Emirates in
2010, President Abdullah Gül, in order to “break the ice” with the Gulf rulers, started
his official meeting by talking about the latest episode of the series Fatmagül’ün Suçu Ne
(“Fatma” in the Arabic-dubbed version), which was very popular in the Gulf and was
watched even by the royal family!  Another anecdote relates to the series Muhteşem
Yüzyıl: In late 2012, Erdoğan called for prosecutors to ban this soap opera, accusing it of
distorting historical  facts.  In  particular,  the  Prime minister  claimed that  the  series
misrepresented Suleiman the Magnificent by portraying him as an emotional man who
spent more time in the harem than in conquests. The series was in fact taken off TV
channels and from Turkish airlines flights for over a week. During that time, we had
the chance to meet with the consul of Turkey in Dubai Elif Çomoğlu Ülgen, who told us
that 
it is highly doubtful that this ban will continue, as Prime minister Erdoğan knows
that the series is very popular all over the Arab world; therefore, he will soon put it
back on the screens, as it serves our soft power in the region22.
34 Indeed, all claims against Muhteşem Yüzyıl were quickly dismissed, and the series was
broadcasted again.  This  clearly  shows that  even when the Turkish government has
negative views of the soap operas, it has nevertheless capitalized on them to increase
Ankara’s attractiveness in the Middle East, and has instrumentalised their popularity to
consolidate its power in the region. 
 
TRT Al Arabiyya: the Turkish government’s attempt to build a regional
power through television. 
35 While  the  export  of  Turkish  soap  operas  is  the  initiative  of  private  cultural
entrepreneurs,  other  media  instruments  have been designed by the  government  in
order to better reach out to the Middle East. In particular, the launching by the Turkish
government  of  an  Arabic-language  TV  channel  –  TRT  Al  Arabiyya  –  and  the
establishment of an Arabic branch of Anadolu Agency shows Ankara’s willingness to
use the media as a means of cultural influence. 
36 In April 2010, at a time in which soap operas were conquering “hearts and minds” in
the Arab world, Prime Minister Erdoğan inaugurated TRT Al Arabiyya in Istanbul. In his
opening speech, Erdoğan stated: 
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TRT will be our common channel, the channel of all Turks and Arabs. It will bind us
to each other. It  will  unite our hearts.  It  will  serve to deepen our relationships,
strengthen our brotherhood, and consolidate our union (TRT Al Arabiyya 2010). 
37 He added: 
Although we are talking different languages in this vast geography, we should not
forget that we have one history, one culture and similar values. We have given a
shape to history together. Be sure that we will give a shape to the future altogether.
We  are  the  members  of  a  civilization  that  places  high  importance  on
neighborliness. 
38 Hence,  TRT  in  Arabic  is  clearly  designed  as  an  instrument  of  “soft  power”.  As  is
reflected in the Prime Minister’s speech, this channel is part of the AKP strategy to
“win the  hearts  and minds”  of  the  Arab public,  therefore  contributing  to  Turkey’s
regional power. In fact, on its website, the channel indicates that its mission and goal is
to create an “interaction between Turks and Arabs,”  to “raise awareness about the
values they have in common”, to “create a mutual understanding”, thus “strengthening
cultural and historical links between these peoples”23. 
39 It  is  obvious that this  channel is  being used to promote a certain official  discourse
about Turkey.  In fact,  the news bulletins and the various talk shows and programs
broadcasted on TRT Al Arabiyya adopt the governmental point of view and attempt to
explain,  justify,  and  legitimize  Ankara’s  political  positions.  For  example,  when
corruption  allegations  against  the  government  broke  out  and  a  political  dispute
erupted with the Cemaat of Fethullah Gülen24,  the news bulletin of TRT Al Arabiyya
attempted  to  defend  Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan  and  his  government  by  portraying  the
Hizmet movement as a “secret and opaque organization”, by designating Gülen as “a
manipulator,” and by offering the Arab public a simplistic narrative in which the AKP is
depicted as victim and Gülen as the “bad guy”. Similarly, following the overthrowing of
Mohammad Morsi in Egypt, TRT Al Arabiyya aired a talk show in which it clearly sided
with the Muslim Brothers, denouncing a “coup,” praising the Turkish government for
its  courageous  stance,  and  implicitly  encouraging  Turks  and  Arabs  to  embrace  the
Rabi’a  Movement25.  Therefore,  this  channel  serves  Ankara’s  public  diplomacy:  It
attempts to communicate, spread, and justify Turkey’s political choices to an Arabic-
speaking public. 
40 However, one must note that no matter how novel and smart TRT Al Arabiyya might be
as an instrument of “soft power”, its effects are limited. With limited experience and
resources  compared to  other  leading channels  in  the  region such as  Al  Jazeera,  Al
Arabiyya, Al Hurra, or France 24 in Arabic, TRT struggles to win a share of the Arab
media  market  and  to  compete  with  well-established  channels.  Moreover,  our  field
research shows that TRT is not appealing to Arab viewers26. In fact, for those in the
Arab  world  who are  “tuned”  to  news  channels  –  that  is  to  say  the  Arab  elite  and
intellectuals – TRT is unappealing precisely because it is perceived as a state-owned
channel that is unable to dissociate from the AKP and to adopt a more independent and
neutral editorial line. In other words, for critical Arab viewers, TRT is perceived as the
“spokesman  of  Ankara”  and  an  instrument  of  the  Turkish  government,  which
undermines its credibility and limits its attractiveness. Thus, given these observations,
it is difficult to say that TRT Al Arabiyya is a successful soft power tool. 
41 In addition to TRT Al Arabiyya,  the AKP government opened bureaus in Beirut and
Cairo for the Turkish press agency Anadolu. These bureaus are in charge of conducting
public  diplomacy:  They  produce  information  in  Arabic  whose  main  purpose  is  to
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promote  a  positive  image  of  Turkey  and  legitimize  the  AKP  government’s  policy
choices.  During our interview with Hamze Tekin,  the vice-president of  the Anadolu
Agency in Beirut, the latter stated the following: 
Our role is to tell a grand narrative about Turkey. We need the Arab world to better
understand Turkey and what our great government is  doing.  We also serve the
other way round: We collect information about the Arab world for our government
so that they can make informed decisions and policy choices27. 
42 This instrument seems to be very efficient today. The majority of Arab news channels
quote Anadolu as their source when mentioning news related to Turkey; they therefore
unknowingly reproduce and spread the official discourse of Turkey. The reason why
these channels use Anadolu is simply because it is a “shortcut” and the easiest way to
obtain information about Turkey. 
43 Having examined the various instruments of projection of Turkish soft power in the
region, we now turn to a detailed and in-depth assessment of their efficiency.
 
III. An assessment of Turkey’s soft power in the Middle
East: an illusionary power of seduction?
The difficulty and limitations of measuring the impact of soft power,
especially in the Middle East region
44 When assessing Turkey’s “soft power” capacity, it is necessary to state one fact from
the  outset:  “Soft  power”  is  not  an  operational,  easy-to-use  concept.  First,  it  is
theoretically and practically difficult – not to say impossible – to measure the concrete
impact of a soft power initiative. The political science community lacks quantitative
instruments to gauge and determine the real consequences of soft power. 
45 Second, soft power does not always translate into political capacity. A country’s culture
and  values  might  appeal  to  other  nations  without  them  accepting  the  political
leadership of this country and or aligning with its political and diplomatic positions. In
the case of the Middle East, we do not find examples and cases in which Turkey’s “soft
power” has led Arab individuals to change their policy preferences because they are
culturally attracted to Turkey. In other words, we do not find instances in which “soft
power” has pushed an actor to do what he would otherwise not do, as in Robert Dahl’s
definition of power. For instance, during the Arab revolutions, people in the Middle
East did not align their political positions with the views of Ankara, even though they
watched Turkish soap operas. In our interviews in Lebanon in particular, we noticed
that  addicts  of  Turkish  diziler  criticized  Ankara’s  policy  vis-à-vis  Syria,  Lebanon’s
neighbouring country. People affiliated to the “March 8 Coalition” – a political coalition
known for its favourable views of Syria and its support for Bashar al-Assad – continued
watching their favourite soap operas while at the same time siding with Bashar and
denouncing the role of Ankara in the Syrian crisis. Hence, watching a soap opera did
not lead viewers to change their political opinions or to defend Turkey’s interests.
46 In more general terms, it is possible to appreciate the soap operas and popular culture
of a country while at the same time being politically opposed to this country. The best
illustration  of  this  is  the  fact  that  the  Middle  East  region  is  amongst  the  biggest
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consumers  of  American  films  and  at  the  same  time  shows  high  levels  of  anti-
Americanism. 
47 Having discussed these analytical difficulties and theoretical limitations for assessing
Turkey’s “soft power” in the region, we now turn to the examination of the practical
consequences of Turkey’s “soft power” in the Middle East in the past decade. 
 
Achievements and shortcomings of Turkey’s “soft power” in the
region
48 The impact of Turkey’s “soft power” in the Middle East is subject to controversy. While
some writers and observers consider that Turkey has won the hearts and minds of
Arabs and Muslims through its “soft power” (Kalin 2011), others argue that Turkey’s
“soft  power” has produced limited positive effects (Altunışık 2011).  We support the
view  that  Turkey’s  “soft  power”  has  produced  highly  limited  effects,  and  that  its
shortcomings outweigh its achievements. 
49 On the positive side, field research and interviews we conducted in the region show
clearly that “soft power” actions are self-reinforcing and create a “virtuous circle”: The
more one watches a soap opera or TRT talk shows, the more one is willing to visit
Turkey for tourism, enrol in a Yunus Emre Cultural Center to learn the Turkish language,
or apply for scholarship to study in Istanbul. Therefore, it is clear that Turkey’s cultural
presence  in  the  Middle  East  has  increased  its  “attractiveness”  and  has  made  Arab
populations curious to discover or re-discover this country28. 
50 On the negative side, while Turkey’s strong cultural presence may have appealed to
some Arab populations, it has also created negative reactions and feelings in certain
segments of  Arab societies.  Consider the example of  soap operas:  Our interviews in
Cairo,  Beirut,  Doha,  and Erbil  show that  while  soap operas  are  popular  among the
“masses” and the general  public,  they are nevertheless negatively perceived by the
intelligentsia and the elite, who perceive them as a “cultural invasion” or as “cultural
imperialism”. What is more, given the religious and cultural diversity of the Middle
East populations, soap operas have failed to please everybody and to create a positive
perception of Turkey in the minds of all Arab people. Muhteşem Yüzyıl, for instance, was
subject  to  much  criticism  from  certain  conservative  segments  of  the  Sunni  Arab
community. In fact, some Sunnis whom we interviewed were shocked by the series and
considered  it  a  “scandal”  to  show  Sultan  Suleiman  making  love  and  supposedly
drinking alcohol. As for the soap opera Gümüş, it drew much criticism from religious
circles for whom Gümüş exhibited a liberal lifestyle that might “corrupt the Muslim
conservative values of Arab youth”29. A Saudi sheikh went as far as to offer a pilgrimage
to the hajj for all those who boycott Turkish soap operas, and a Syrian sheikh ruled that
carrying the picture of the Turkish character Mehmet on one’s T-shirt invalidates one’s
prayers (Buccianti 2010). 
51 In addition, it seems that the Arab revolutions have negatively affected Turkey’s “soft
power” in the Middle East. First, the Arab Spring has dealt a blow to Turkey’s prestige
in  the  region,  pushing  some  segments  of  the  Arab  populations  to  have  negative
perceptions  of  Turkey.  As  a  consequence,  they  have  naturally  shown  a  certain
indifference to Turkish products in general and to Turkish soap operas in particular,
and have even called for a boycott of  these products as a means of protest against
Turkey’s interventions in the internal affairs of the Arab world. For example, a number
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of Egyptian artists and filmmakers have initiated a boycott of Turkish soap operas to
protest  “Turkish  intervention  in  Egyptian  affairs  and  the  position  of  the  Turkish
government  towards  Egypt’s  30th of  June  Revolution” 30.  Second,  Erdoğan’s  harsh
rhetoric and tough stances against Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Abdelfattah al-Sissi in
Egypt  have  had  disastrous  effects  on  Turkey’s  “soft  power,”  by  causing  Arab
governments to take official actions against Turkish cultural products: in fact, in Egypt,
President al-Sissi imposed a ban on the broadcast of Turkish soap operas (Mc Arthur
Aug. 22, 2013); in Syria, as stated above, the government not only stopped broadcasting
Turkish series, but also demanded that Syrian companies suspend their dubbing work
of Turkish soaps. Consequently, Arab viewers across the Middle East were not able to
follow season 4 of Muhteşem Yüzyıl because the episodes were only dubbed until season
3. Third, as Syria has turned into a real quagmire and a political problem for the AKP
government, there has been a shift in Turkey away from “soft power” into an open
embrace of “hard power”, as exemplified by Turkey’s military intervention in Syria to
evacuate the tomb of Suleiman Shah, its participation in the international coalition
against  Daesh,  and  its  call  for  a  NATO  military  operation  in  Syria.  Hence,  after
wandering in the avenues of “soft power” in the 2000s, Turkey is now moving back to
the traditional “hard power” approach. 
 
Conclusion
52 This paper has examined the actors and instruments involved in Turkey’s projection of
“soft power” in the Arab world and analysed the efficiency of “soft power” actions in
the  region.  It  has  demonstrated  that  Turkish  soap  operas  and  TV  channel  TRT  Al
Arabiyya  have  had  limited  effects  in  terms  of  increasing  Turkey’s  general  power
capacity in the Middle East. 
53 While  Turkey’s  “soft  power” has  had a  limited political  impact,  it  has  nevertheless
drawn Arab populations’ attention to this country, thus creating a debate around the
Turkish “brand”. Therefore, we suggest that the real impact of soap operas and the TRT
is the emergence of a debate in the Middle East around the so-called “Turkish model”.
In  fact,  Turkey’s  “soft  power,”  along  with  its  economic  dynamism  and  proactive
diplomacy,  have allowed the country to  gain regional  exposure and to  become the
subject of a heated debate around the “model” it represents. Here lies the true success
of Turkey’s “soft power” projection: the cultural presence of Turkey in the Middle East
has drawn the attention of Arab and Muslim populations to this country, and stirred
their curiosity to understand the Turkish experience, or the so-called “Turkish model”
(Altunışık  2005:  45-63;  Göksel  2012:  99-120).  Whether  this  “model”  is  admired  or
criticized, whether it is applicable to the Middle East or not, is not in itself important
for assessing the efficiency of Turkey’s “soft power”. Rather, what is important in our
eyes is  the fact  that  this  “soft  power” has  succeeded in building a  certain “brand”
image of Turkey.
54 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether Turkey’s “soft power” and the debate it has
generated around the “Turkish model” have allowed the country to acquire a “place in
the Sun” in the Middle East or have simply won her “fifteen minutes of fame” (Ülgen
2010).
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NOTES
1. Interview with İlber Ortaylı, April 2014, Istanbul.
2. With Syria over the Hatay province, and with Iraq over Mossul. 
3. For example, Turkey and Syria were at the brink of war in 1999 because Syria was hosting the
Kurdish PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.
4. Arab populations resented the policies of “Turkification” led by the Ottoman Empire during its
period of decline. As early as 1913, the Arab National Congress held in Paris demanded reforms
that  would  grant  Arabs  living  under  the  Ottoman  Empire  more  autonomy.  The  adopted
resolutions  included  making Arabic  “an  official  language  in  the  Arab  provinces...  the
employment of Arab troops in their home provinces except in time of war... stronger locally-
controlled provincial government” (Khalidi 1980: 309-310). 
5. He  was  born  in  the  conservative  city  of  Konya  and taught  International  Relations  at  the
University of Malaysia in the 1990s. 
6. Alvaro Garcia Linera is the intellectual who conceptualized the politics of the left parties in
Bolivia, and served as the theorist of Morales. He became vice-president of Bolivia. 
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7. Personified here by Mehmet’s mother and grandfather. 
8. According to a survey by the Turkish think tank TESEV, 78% of  Arabs watch at  least  one
romantic Turkish soap opera. (Akgün, Perçinoğlu and Senyücel Gündoğar 2010: 16).
9. Interview with Timur Savcı, owner of Tims Productions, Istanbul, April 2014. 
10. Interviews with a dozen of young student graduates in Lebanon, Egypt and Iraqi Kurdistan. 
11. The author of  this  article  watched all  the episodes of  the series ;  the terms “Islam” and
“jihad” are mentioned more than 700 times. 
12. Season 2, episode 35. 
13. Season 1, episode 48. 
14. The authoritarian regimes of the Arab world are seen by their citizens as “subservient” to the
West. 
15. Interview in Istanbul (translated from Turkish by the author), April 2014. 
16. Season 1, Episode 10. 
17. In May 2010, Turkey took part in a maritime convoy to Gaza, known as the Gaza Freedom
Flotilla, which carried humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population and attempted to break the
Israeli siege on Gaza. Turkey participated in this Flotilla through the Turkish NGO İnsan Hak ve
Hürriyetleri  ve  İnsan  Yardım  Vakfı (The  Foundation  for  Human  Rights  and  Freedoms  and
Humanitarian Relief), which bought a ship called Mavi Marmara (The Blue Marmara) and used it
to carry aid to Gaza. As a result of Israel’s assault on the Flotilla, nine Turkish activists were
killed. Turkey reacted harshly and Prime Minister Erdoğan demanded an official apology from
the Israeli government, compensation for the victims’ families, and a lift of the Israeli siege on
Gaza.  This  episode  made  Turkey  very  popular  in  the  Middle  East,  since  it  was  seen  as  the
champion of the Palestinian cause. 
18. Tourist visas were in fact lifted between the two countries in 2009. 
19. The dubbing work is done by Syrian actors residing in the United Arab Emirates or by Emirati
people.  It  is  still  done in  the Syrian dialect  in  order  to  ensure continuity  with the previous
episodes. 
20. The  name  “Muhannad”  is  a  common  name  in  the  Arab  world;  it  is  not  the  same  as
“Muhammad”, the name of the Prophet. 
21. Off-the-record interview, January 2014. 
22. November 2012, Dubai. 
23. http://www.trtarabic.com/trtworld/ar/
24. The  Fethullah  Gülen  movement  (also  known  in  Turkish  as  “Cemaat”  or  “Hizmet”)  is  a
transnational religious and social movement whose proclaimed objective is to form a “Golden
generation” [altın nesil] of young Muslims who are well-versed in religion and open to modernity,
globalization and sciences. Until 2013, the movement and the AKP were engaged in a “marriage
of  convenience”  against  a  common  enemy  represented  by  the  military  and  the  Kemalist
establishment. See Yavuz and Esposito (2009). 
25. The Rabi’a Movement is a large sit-in in Rabi’a square in Egypt in support of the Muslim
Brotherhood and former President Morsi against the coup of President Abdelfattah al-Sissi. The
Movement coincided with the outbreak of the Gezi Park revolt in Turkey (June 2013). 
26. Ten interviews conducted with intellectuals, university professors, students, and housewives,
between 2012 and 2013. 
27. Interview, Beirut, September 2012.
28. Survey mentioned above. 
29. See mention of the fatwa by Sheikh Abdelaziz Abdallah Al Sheikh in (Wafi Sep. 14, 2008).
30. On 30 June 2013, the one-year anniversary of the inauguration of Mohammad Morsi into the
presidency, Egyptians took to the streets calling for his ouster. Turkey called this “military coup”
against a democratically elected president and sided with Morsi. See Hürriyet Daily News (Aug. 7,
2013).
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ABSTRACTS
This paper questions Turkey’s “soft power” capacity in the Arab world and Middle East region. It
attempts to analyse the role of the different actors involved in the projection of Turkey’s “soft
power”  vis-à-vis  the  Arab  world.  The  paper  distinguishes  between  public/governmental  and
private/non-governmental agents producing “soft power” and examines the interaction between
them. 
The analysis first focuses on the conceptual framework that underlies Turkey’s paradigm shift
from hard power to cultural, or “soft,” power in the Middle East. In particular, it examines the
key elements of the “strategic depth” theory, or the so-called “Davutoğlu doctrine,” and shows
how a new vision for Turkey’s international role and cultural attractiveness has been formulated.
The paper then examines the tools and instruments used to project Turkey’s cultural power in
the Middle  East:  in  particular,  the  export  of  soap operas  [diziler]  to  the Arab world  and the
launching of an Arabic-language TV channel (TRT Al Arabiyya). The author attempts to identify
the actors involved in each of these strategies. Finally, the paper offers an assessment of the real
impact  of  Turkish soap operas  and TRT channel  in  the Middle  East.  It  stresses  the limits  of
Turkey’s  “soft  power”  in  the  region  both  in  terms  of  conceptual/theoretical  relevance  and
contextual efficacy, and examines the impact of the Arab uprisings on Turkey’s projection of soft
power  vis-à-vis  the  region.  The  author  concludes  that  Turkey’s  cultural  power  has  thus  far
produced  limited  outcomes  and  has  had  few tangible  positive  effects  in  increasing  Turkey’s
general power capacity in the Arab world.
INDEX
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